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Globalization Redux: 
Can China’s Inside-Out Strategy Catalyze Economic Development  
Across Its Asian Borderlands and Beyond*  
 
By Xiangming Chen 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
As the narrative of globalization in crisis heats up, China has stepped up as a new champion of 
globalization with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This article repositions ‘China in the Global 
South’ to the front and center of the globalization discourse. Through a triangular framework, I 
differentiate and reconnect the three ‘master’ processes of urbanization, development and 
globalization to understand the inside-outside connections between China’s domestic 
transformation and strong impact in the Global South. Using China vs. Southeast Asia and 
Central Asia, I evaluate if and how China’s inside-out strategy can catalyze mutually beneficial 
development across some Asian borderlands and beyond.   
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Introduction 
 
 
Globalization is an inherently uneven spatial process that tracks the unequal cross-national 
distribution of economic and political power. This power is leveraged by certain dominant 
nations’ comparative and competitive strengths during given eras of world history. Increasingly, 
dominant global influence from certain nation states has shifted toward their powerful global 
cities or other cities of strategic and special functions. The overlap and mismatch between 
national and urban power creates more complex spatial inequalities at the regional and local 
levels. It however can also generate cooperative tendencies to counter and ameliorate unequal 
development and spatial disparity.  
These shifts and their consequences raise new questions about how to understand the two 
basic dimensions of national versus city based influence on nearby and faraway places and 
people: scale and connectivity. While scale represents important attributes of discrete origins or 
locales of power, connectivity embodies the relational aspect of influence. The greater scale and 
scope of power originates from more strategic locations, more key points of contacts and their 
stronger spillovers. Stronger connectivity of power stems from the larger number, more variety 
and greater intensity of connections that are both virtual through financial networks and physical 
via transport links. Relative to the heavy focus on the power and connectivity of global financial 
networks, the latter deserve our renewed attention in light of China’s infrastructure-led approach 
to globalization treated in this paper.  
While the scale and connectivity of power underpin the more conventional reach and impact 
of globalization, their continued importance has recently been entangled with the shifting 
political ideologies of existing powerful states that have also been the biggest drivers of 
globalization. With the rhetoric of ‘America First’ and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
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Partnership (TPP), the United States under President Trump has taken a big step back from 
globalization. Although Brexit may not be exactly anti-global, this move reflects a backlash 
against the practices of globalization such as open borders and immigration. 
These retreats from globalization look like temporary setbacks from the long history of 
globalization. Taking a very long view, Chanda (2007) saw the Silk Road as an early 
manifestation of globalization in terms of long distance trade. If we emphasize the broad scope 
and accelerated speed of more varied and dense global flows, it would make sense to date the 
beginning of globalization to the 1970s. Supporting this timing of globalization was China 
opening its doors and joining the global economy around 1980. This helped to usher in a 
growing body of scholarship advocating globalization as reflecting an open and ‘borderless’ 
world economy (see Chen, 2005). Globalization has since moved up a big notch measured in 
trade as a share of the world’s GDP, which rose from 39% in 1980 to 60% in 2008.1 Despite the 
global financial crisis in 2008, globalization measured in the composite Global Connectedness 
Index rebounded through 2015 (Ghemawat, 2017). 
As globalization becomes more intensified, it has brought to light the negative consequences 
such as the erosion of national sovereignty and growing income inequality. Looking back 
through the lens of the Great Depression, James (2008) found an important part of its cause in 
the resentment against global capital flows, trade and migration and drew this as a lesson for 
contemporary globalization. Critiquing globalization as a paradox from a Western perspective, 
Rodrik (2011) contends that economic globalization cannot co-exist with both democratic 
politics and national sovereignty, either of which must be sacrificed for pursuing globalization.  
Having benefited considerably from globalization, China has become a counter to this 
paradox. It has pursued globalization with a strong single Party-state, which does not have to 
worry about the erosion of democracy or loss of sovereignty. China has also gained considerable 
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confidence and stature from becoming more globally connected and integrated. Against  the 
West’s recent retreats from globalization, China has stepped up to the front and center of the pro-
globalization plate. President Xi Jinping spoke confidently about the virtue of open trade and the 
danger in retreating from it at the 2017 World Economic Forum. Backing up this rhetoric with 
strong action has been the accelerated implementation of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) that China launched in 2013. According to McKinsey’s new Financial Connectedness 
Ranking, a key dimension of China’s global connectedness has grown, with its outward stock of 
bank lending and foreign direct investment (FDI) tripling from 2007 to 2016 (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2017). 
China becoming the new champion of globalization intrigues me to pose two critical research 
questions. One is how does China lead globalization in ways that differ from the Western 
economic powers? It calls for probing if China can produce a different mode of globalization 
given its demographic size, newly acquired economic wealth and political institution. The other 
question is how to gauge the growing impact of China-led globalization. It begs an investigation 
into if China can deliver more benefits from its approach to globalization by creating greater 
wealth while mitigating inequality. Both questions require a new starting point and deeper 
analysis beyond the existing literature on globalization, principally because China is a distinctive 
global power driven by a strong state. With a dual identity as both a leading global power and a 
large developing nation, at least for much of its interior, China’s approach to globalization calls 
for fresh analysis. This paper meets this scholarly challenge by examining China’s leading role 
in shaping a new era of globalization via its widespread and yet geographically concentrated 
influence in the Global South.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section develops an integrated framework for 
understanding the sources, mechanisms and effects of Chinese globalization emphasiing its 
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inside-out dialectic logic. I intend the framework to clarify the distinctive, if not exceptional, 
combination of China’s internal and external regional conditions that has catalyzed its global 
initiatives across various Asian borderlands. The framework is then used to guide a pair of case 
studies focused on Southeast Asia and Central Asia for comparing how China’s global strategies 
are reshaping urban and regional landscapes around its borderlands and far beyond. The last 
section explores the broader implications from the interface between the framework and two case 
analyses. 
 
Decoding China’s impact in the Global South 
 
To the extent that we see the current phase of globalization in some kind of crisis and China as a 
counter force to it, it invokes the translation of the English word ‘crisis’ into the Chinese 
language (危机), whose two characters literally mean ‘crisis-opportunity’. There may be a 
Chinese philosophical dialectic ring to the translation in conveying a sense of contradiction or 
balance. If globalization is in crisis, real or perceived, it can be accompanied by a set of new 
opportunities for creating an alternative approach to globalization associated with by China’s 
development policies and practices over the last three decades. 
The scale dimension of China’s global economic power is obvious. With a continental sized 
territory and world’s largest population, China sustained the largest share of the world’s GDP 
and peaked at around 35% by 1820, far ahead of the relative positions of the Western 
industrializing economies at that time). Having dropped to about 3% by 1980, China’s weight of 
the world’s GDP returned to around 15% today, two centuries after its historical zenith.2 The 
combined force of reform, opening and transformation over only three decades has elevated 
China to: a) the world’s second largest economy; b) the world’s largest trading nation; c) the 
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world’s largest exporter; d) the world’s largest manufacturer; e) the world’s largest energy 
consumer; f) the world’s largest auto market; g) the world’s largest user of steel, cement and 
copper; and h) the world’s largest applicant for patents. All these superlatives magnify the scale 
dimension of China’s global economic power, but they tell us little about how these top rankings 
of China’s strength translate into real impact and how and where this impact is truly felt. Scale of 
power coupled with its connectivity is key to understanding China’s multifaceted influence 
across the Global South. 
The large scale of economic power generally translates into an extensive connectivity of that 
power, even though this association is not always linear, and is instead contingent on how a 
given nation or city projects its internal strength in forming external connections carrying and 
extending a powerful influence. It also depends on how we think about measuring the correlation 
between scale and connectivity of a new and different global power like China. As China grew 
into the world’s top trading nation, trade as a share of its GDP, a more conventional measure of 
trade dependency or connectivity, rose from 9% in 1960s to 37% in 2016.
3
 While this was a big 
increase, from a time when China was basically closed to world trade, China’s current share of 
its GDP is expectedly small relative to its overall economic scale. It is smaller than the world’s 
average of 58% and even slightly lower than India’s 40%, while the export manufacturing 
powerhouse of Germany registered at 84% for 2016.
4
 Looking at global economic power from a 
different comparative vantage point, the number of countries for which China is the largest 
trading partner stands at 124 relative to 56 for the United States (Khanna, 2016, Map 2). His map 
shows that the US’ top trading ties are heavily concentrated in North America, Western Europe 
and the Caribbean, whereas most of China’s trade ties reach Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Australia. Map 3 in his book also shows the increasing centrality of East Asia with China at the 
core in supply chains and trade networks. 
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 The combination of one long coast and one lengthy land border facilitates China’s trade with 
a larger number of countries, especially those around its (south)western borders extending all the 
way to Europe and the Middle East. Factoring this geographical thinking triggers other ways of 
measuring the connectivity dimension of power beyond conventional border and long-distance 
trade. More extensive overland contiguity or adjacency is conducive to the construction of 
transport infrastructure for linking more geographical points of trade and economic development. 
China is geographically endowed and positioned to do so. Favorable geographical conditions, 
however, are insufficient for enhancing the scale of power through extending its connectivity 
unless they are activated by domestic economic forces. To fully understand this set of factors 
inside and outside the Chinese context, we propose a tripartite framework below. 
 
Triangulating China’s inside and outside 
In the academic and policy scholarship on China’s global rise and impact, there is a tendency to 
emphasize the scale and scope of China’s quest for commodities and energy, massive trade, 
growing outward investment, and extensive infrastructure provision in the Global South (see 
Cardenal and Araújo, 2013; Economy and Levi, 2014; French, 2014). This prevalent narrative 
often leads to an inflated view that China’s rise will inevitably weakens the Western (US) 
dominance (Jacques, 2012) in a multipolar world, although others have tempered this view by 
pointing to the possibility of constraining China’s partial global power (Christensen, 2015; 
Shambaugh, 2013).  
To regionalize the discussion and analysis of China’s global impact, we need to 
recontextualize it in the continued discourse and debate about the “Asian Century” that has been 
alive since the 1980s when Japan instead of China was the rising Asian power. Its nuances aside, 
the ’Asian Century’ debate features a persistent split between two camps representing the 
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euphoric and alarming sides, with China’s rise and its regional impact looming large on both 
sides. From the cheering side, Mahbubani (2008) attributed the rise of Asia, principally China to 
their adoption of seven pillars of Western wisdom such as free-market economics, pragmatism 
and culture of peace. While it is debatable if these are inherently Western wisdom, it reflects a 
Western-centric way of seeing Asia’s rise with China at its center as following or imitating the 
West (also see Ferguson, 2012). The most recent voice cautioning against the ’Asian Century’ is 
Michael Auslin (2017) who provides a comprehensive account of the economic, military, 
political and demographic risks that may threaten Asia as a fractured region of stagnation and 
instability. This debate, often tinged by an outside Western imprint and outrun by dynamic 
trends, sheds little light on how China exerts new spatially focused impacts across Asia from its 
distinctive domestic urban development trajectory and outward oriented BRI.  
Moving beyond the more conventional debate, Anaya Roy (2016) has turned our analytic 
gaze toward the set of flows and transactions crossing more intra-Asian boundaries that make the 
region less geographically bounded in nation states and more in terms of interreferenced urban 
and regional spaces. In shifting the central research question ’Where is Asia’ to ’When is Asia’, 
Roy has opened up a new spatio-temporal vista for analyzing how China, as the economic core 
and geographical center of a rising Asia, can affect the region’s present and future through its 
spatially ambitious BRI with its long horizon. Taking advantage of this new conceptual place of 
departure, I follow a small number of recent attempts to trace the stages of China’s westward 
development from its domestic space to its western overland neighbors (Summers, 2016; Yeh 
and Wharton, 2016). Moreover, I go a step further to offer a broader and more systematic 
framework for capturing and explaining China’s widespread impact in the Global South that can 
in turn guide a focused comparison of this impact in Southeast Asia vs Central Asia. Figure 1 
presents this framework.  
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Figure 1 about here 
 
In Figure 1, I conceptualize China’s impact in the Global South as stemming from and 
feeding back to three ‘master processes’ of urbanization, development and globalization. China 
figures prominently in the literature on each of the three broad topics. The combined scale, speed 
and pathway of China’s urbanization, development and globalization reflect both the 
conventional and distinctive drivers and outcomes of these processes. While China had a low 
level of urbanization and development with a high degree of economic closeness until three and 
a half decades ago, it has moved rapidly through all three processes with inside and outside 
consequences that translate into an extensive footprint in the Global South. This calls for taking 
apart each leg of the triangle and then putting them back together.       
 
Steering and feeding urbanization 
China’s urbanization has generated a large body of work with a heavy focus on some of the 
booming megacities like Shanghai and Shenzhen, especially on the massive migration and 
infrastructure construction (a familiar literature not necessary for review here, see a special issue 
of CJRES, November 2016). What is lacking is a distillation of the most salient features of 
China’s urbanization and of how it has interacted with the world beyond its borders, especially 
its neighboring countries or regions. 
According to an official narrative
5
, China’s urbanization has avoided two ‘urbanization 
traps’—the ‘overurbanization’ in Latin America where urban growth has exceeded economic 
development, especially job creation in cities, and the ‘poverty urbanization’ in Africa where 
cities have not delivered the benefits of modernization to rural migrants who became poorer as 
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informal settlers after permanently leaving agricultural land. This official policy spin aside, I 
summarize China’s distinctive urbanization as four ‘S’s’. 
State steering. Generally speaking, China’s urbanization begins and ends with the powerful 
state driving urbanization with a very ‘visible hand’. This perspective sees the state crowding out 
other forces in shaping the rapid pace and large scale of China’s urban transformation. Despite 
its wide acceptance, the state-centric model of China’s urbanization is not one-dimensional and 
spatially uniform. The state has acted vertically with regard to how the central and municipal 
government interacted both cooperatively and competitively to drive urban growth. The state has 
also mattered horizontally in targeting different cities and regions with specific policies. The 
Chinese state takes on a distinctively steering role in using a variety of policies and interventions 
to guide China’s urbanization (Chen, 2014). 
The state’s steering of urban growth began with the creation of China’s first and largest 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Shenzhen bordering Hong Kong in 1979. Besides the soft 
steering of providing lower taxes as incentives for Hong Kong investors, a stronger version of 
steering was the state providing upfront financing for large-scale physical infrastructure to spur 
and support industrial growth. As this rapid growth later ran into bottlenecks such as the shortage 
of land and water, as well as environmental degradation, the Shenzhen government tightened 
restrictions on land approval and elevated environmental standards by banning polluting 
industries including papermaking and tanning (Chen and de’Medici, 2010). 
As Shenzhen took off in the 1980s, the state’s steering of urban growth moved north along 
China’s eastern seaboard with the designation of 14 other coastal cities as Open Cities in 1984 
and their state financed Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs). The 
construction of residential towers and shopping malls also began to scale up and spread around 
the booming coastal cities. With the state steering more resources into inter-city transport 
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infrastructure, adjacent secondary cities benefited from the positive spillover effects from hubs 
like Shenzhen and Shanghai, leading to regional economic agglomeration in the Pearl River and 
Yangtze River Deltas (Chen, 2007). 
As the coastal cities raced far ahead of the interior cities, the Chinese state enhanced its 
steering role in urban growth by prioritizing key western cities as new hubs of accelerated 
development to stimulate the catch-up of the vast but lagging interior. By designating Chongqing 
as a central government municipality in 1997, the state gave this megacity greater autonomy and 
financial support. Chongqing was allowed to lower enterprise tax from 33 to 24%t, or even to 
15% if these projects were located in the city’s ETDZ. The state’s steering of urbanization not 
only has involved both the central and local government across regions but also shifted up and 
down the administrative structure depending on the strategic importance of given cities. 
Speed and scale. Given the strong steering role of the state, the fast speed and large scale of 
China’s urbanization is fully expected, and also unprecedented in the Global South. With only 
13% of its population being urban around 1950, China was behind India’s 17% and comparable 
to the level of urbanization in some parts of Africa today. With still less than 20% urban around 
1980, China has urbanized much faster than India ever since, reaching about 55% urban today 
relative to India’s 35% (Chen, 2014).China also stands out among the Global South in adding a 
large number of new cities and scaling up already large cities. With approximately 200 cities 
around 1980, China has over 600 cities today. Cities with one million plus population in China 
rose from 20 in 1980 to 102 in 2012, whereas the number of million plus cities in fast urbanizing 
Africa as a whole grew from 17 to about 50 today. Europe as a whole has 35 such cities.
6
  
In speeding up urbanization and building large cities, China has created a huge demand for 
imported commodities and energy, mostly from the Global South. From a country with no 
private cars to the largest auto market in the world, China has dramatically accelerated its petrol 
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consumption. With millions of high-rise and lower buildings shooting up in its hundreds of large 
cities that have to be cooled and heated, China has led energy consumption by the world’s cities. 
In addition, the millions of kilometer of fiber optic cables in China’s skyscrapers and factories 
require a lot of copper from large mines in Chile and Zambia. The evidence is clear that the scale 
and speed of China’s urbanization drive its huge demand for imported commodities and energy 
(see Figure 1 and Campanella, 2008).  
As China feeds its urbanization with imported commodities and energy, it has turned around 
in extending its mode of infrastructure led urbanization to the Global South, especially Africa. 
The market share of Chinese companies in Africa’s construction sector rose sharply from 9.9% 
in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, while the share of US contractors dropped from 24.1% to 6.7% 
(Huang and Chen, 2016). A new residential town near Luanda, Angola built by China and empty 
for some time reminds of the many newly built ghost cities and towns in China (Shepherd, 
2015). Through multiple cross-national channels, China’s urbanization not only has fed on 
commodities and energy from the Global South but also left its strong imprint on the latter’s 
cities. 
 
Connected and transferable development 
If urbanization constitutes a place based source and driver of China’s domestic transformation 
and international influence, the development leg of the triangle stretches China’s inside-outside 
connection. On the surface, China seems to have followed the footsteps of export-oriented 
industrialization previously pursued by the former East Asian tigers such as South Korea and 
Taiwan. This strategy made all the sense for China given its then comparative advantages in 
lower labor and land costs. If we look more closely at China’s political institution, territorial and 
demographic scale and regional diversity, China has traveled a more distinctive path of 
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development closely tied to its urbanization that has ultimately translated into a centrifugal 
impact in the Global South. 
Relative to the East Asian developmental state, the Chinese state has been more purposeful 
and interventionist since the outset. While China’s first SEZs around 1980 were similar to the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) set up in South Korea and Taiwan during 1965-1970, the 
Chinese government designed and shaped them with two more ambitious goals and supportive 
strategies. First, the SEZs were intended to experiment with capitalism and market under a 
centrally planned socialist economy. The zones were located on China’s southeast coast, far 
away from the political and economic centers, to minimize the spatial spill of potential failure. 
But they were geographically contiguous and adjacent with Hong Kong and Taiwan, which were 
willing to move surplus capital and declining factories over the land and sea borders into these 
zones. The generous tax incentives and bold policy reforms in the SEZs like labor contract 
singled the state’s commitment to make them successful as a longer term model for subsequent 
development. Second, the Chinese state went much farther than its South Korea and Taiwanese 
counterparts in building the physical infrastructure needed for much larger scale manufacturing. 
The ‘first mover’ advantages of a few SEZs extended into the follow-up development and 
prosperity of large coastal cities from the early 1980s into the 1990s. The economic gap between 
the booming coastal and lagging inland cities grew large. While this was the intended goal of 
securing quicker and more efficient results from the much better endowed coastal region, it 
turned out as an unintended consequence of uneven regional development. In response, the 
Chinese state stepped up its interventionist role around 2000 when it introduced the so-called 
‘Go West’ initiative. It consisted of a set of top-down policies to direct more investment to the 
interior and to encourage coastal cities to relocate uncompetitive industries to the inland cities. 
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If the state in late East Asian developing economies needed to be more engaged and 
interventionist vs. the market (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1994), the Chinese state has done much 
more in dealing with serious and complex uneven regional development arising from spatially 
targeted development in China’s diverse economy. The Chinese approach can be characterized 
as connected and transferable that has facilitated a staged and coordinated westward movement 
of financial resources and development activities (see Figure 2). Besides steering coastal cities 
and firms to shift investment west, the state has built up and out an extensive highway system 
and high speed train network, both the world’s longest, that link the coastal region to the 
majority of cities in the interior region (zones 1 and 2 in Figure 2). By 2015, China’s high speed 
network consisting of four vertical (north-south) and four horizontal (east-west) trunk routes 
totaled 19000 kms, 9661 of which carried an average speed of 300 kms/hour. By 2025, the 
system is projected to expand to eight vertical and eight horizontal trunk routes with more spur 
lines that will connect all cities of 500000 or more residents and create a 1-4 hour travel radius 
between all these cities (Xu, 2017). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
With faster and wider transport connections, investment has moved west also as a result of 
spatially differentiated factors of production between zone 1 and 2. The average manufacturing 
wage in China’s central and western provinces were only 21% and 25% of the coastal average in 
2000, and only went up to 39% and 42% in 2013. This wage differential was a key factor in 
inducing some coastal manufacturers to relocate to China’s inland provinces to take advantage of 
lower costs and policy concessions. By 2015, the value of domestic investment in five central 
provinces (in zone 2) was 2.5 times that of foreign investment in China (Ann, 2017). The strong 
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and multifaceted role of the Chinese state in ameliorating uneven regional development further 
accentuates the necessity of state intervention in late or lagging development beyond the East 
Asian developmental state over three decades ago (Clifton et al., 2017). It also serves as a major 
mechanism for connecting and coordinating infrastructure, jobs, firms and wealth across cities 
and regions regarding what Dunford and Liu (2017) call uneven and combined development 
(U&CD).  
To ensure that uneven development can be turned into combined and connected 
development, the Chinese state has used its still strong top-down administrative level in creating 
special partnerships between wealth coastal cities and poor border cities in the far west. For 
example, Shenzhen and Shanghai have been directed to provide economic assistance to Kashgar, 
China’s most western city located near Xinjiang’s border with Pakistan. The Shenzhen 
government has granted 10 billion RMB ($1.5 billion) to build a new campus for the University 
of Kashgar. Companies from Shanghai have set up factories in Kashgar’s Economic and 
Technological Development Zone designated in 2010. In a most recent and important move of 
transferable development, the Chinese state elevated an expansive region encompassing the city 
of Kashgar to a national level SEZ, with the package of special incentives originally granted to 
Shenzhen and other three SEZs. This designation has raised Kashgar, an ancient city on the Silk 
Road, to a key city for BRI, granting it the same level of national development priority as the 
Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and the northern megaregion including Beijing, 
Tianjin and Hebei province. While the spatial extension and transfer of the SEZ model has 
continued since the 1980s, the special transfer of both financial resources and special policy from 
China’s southeast coast to the far western frontier reflects the significance of ’Going West’ and 
’Going Out’ through BRI as linked manifestations of China’s development practice and 
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discourse (Yeh and Wharton, 2016).  It accentuates China’s new effort to globalize beyond its 
western borders (from zone 2 into zones 3 and 4, see Figure 2).  
 
Driving alternative globalization, regionally 
 
The spatial intersection between China’s urbanization and development moving west 
represents its new primary approach to globalization, triggered and fueled by the official launch 
of BRI in 2013. While China’s global economic ties have remained strongest and most extensive 
through its east coast hubs like Hong Kong and Shanghai, its small western border cities have 
begun to channel a new wave of China-led globalization from powerful domestic sources and 
places to China’s western frontier and far beyond. Building on its legacy of ‘neighborhood’ or 
‘periphery’ diplomacy (Summers, 2016), China now advances the globally ambitious BRI from 
and through its “Opening up West” initiative and momentum. This overland inside-out policy 
has begun to catalyze catch-up development of both sides of China’s western borderlands, thus 
magnifying its overall impact in the Global South including a larger swathe of Eurasia not 
traditionally categorized with this label.    
In assessing China’s new and spatially varied impact in the Global South today, we need to 
acknowledge a long backdrop seeded over six decades ago. At the Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia in 1955--the first large Asian–African Conference, China, represented by Premier 
Zhou Enlai, played a prominent role as the discussions by the newly independent nations focused 
on its tension with the United States, the West in general and other Asian states. That conference 
was key in defining and pushing forward the Non-Aligned Movement built on the collectively 
agreed principles of national independence, territorial integrity, and the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialism. China was actively involved in this movement and later with The 
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Group of 77 promoting the economic interests of developing nations. In fact, China implemented 
its ideological affinity with ‘The Third World’ through major aid projects for Asian and African 
countries. While very poor, the Chinese government offered cumulative aid to Vietnam worthy 
almost $20 billion in today’s value through 1976 and built the Tanzania-Zambia Railway at a 
cost equivalent of $3.8 billion today during 1970-1975 (Chen and Myers, 2013). This historical 
precedent lurks behind a more developed China to engage with the Global South today. 
Having benefited most as the largest developing economy from globalization, China has 
become the kind of new economic power better prepared to lead more inclusive globalization.   
Spanning over 60 countries and 65% of the world’s population including old members and what 
may be labeled a new region of the Global South like Central Asia, as well as Europe, BRI has a 
spatially inclusive and diverse coverage. With a projected total outlay of over $1 trillion, BRI 
will dwarf the Marshall Plan financially, with no request for military alliances. Key Chinese 
government agencies driving BRI have dubbed it as leading the new globalization 2.0.
7
  
According to Liu and Dunford (2017), the most salient feature of the BRI approach to 
globalization is its inclusivity that differs significantly from the neoliberal version of 
globalization. It reflects China’s emphasis is on strategic international economic partnerships and 
multilateral credit to address investment, infrastructure, employment and economic 
development’ (p. 325), all of which are critical to the Global South.  
Partly motivating this official posture is a set of domestic economic concerns including 
slower growth, continued production overcapacity, consumption trailing investment and 
increasingly saturated construction market. By 2006 China were in over-production in 10 
industries, especially steel, aluminum, cement, oil refining and wind power (Pieterse, 2015). 
Since 2007 China has lost millions of factory jobs due to the global financial crisis and 
accelerated automation, creating more surplus labor that can no longer absorbed back in the 
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countryside. During 2014-2016, China had to reduce steel production amounting to 120% of the 
global total and leading to a loss of 201000 steel workers in 2016 alone.
8
 These pressures, some 
of which structural in economic imbalance and others contingent like the financial crisis 
(Pieterse, 2015), have reinforced the powerful push of ‘Go West’ to open up new investment 
outlets, trade channels and construction projects. Of all the domestic drivers, China’s 
construction experience and expertise accumulated from building numerous roads and bridges 
and some extraordinary mega-projects like the Qinghai-Tibet high speed train have turned 
infrastructure into a main focus and strength of China-led globalization into neighboring Asia.     
 
A pair of case studies 
 
How do we find empirical evidence to interrogate the thesis that China now drives an 
alternative globalization that originates from deep domestic sources and traverses and influences 
its western borderlands?  Following the relational logic crossing from Figure 1 to 2, I have 
identified the Southeast Asian and Central Asian subregions (highlighted in Figure 2) as 
empirical cases for a parallel analysis as opposed to a head-to-head comparison. As the guiding 
rationale for this approach, this pair of cases, in both similar and different ways, can help us to 
understand how China has realigned the inside and outside of the relationship among its 
urbanization, development and globalization (Figure 1). More specifically, the two cases will 
illustrate how China, through  spatially connected domestic and cross-border zones,  is capable 
of  catalyzing catch-up regional development in its remote regions, near abroad and farther 
beyond (Figure 2).. 
 
The China-Southeast Asia border region and beyond 
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 In the first case study, I trace the policy and factor mobility from China’s coastal region to its 
border region with mainland Southeast Asia (bolded box in row 3, Figure 2). This analysis starts 
with an acknowledgment that border cities and regions, which were once remote and 
underdeveloped spaces, have picked up both the speed and scope of urban development. Small 
and isolated cities and towns have sprung out from once politically trivial and economically 
marginal landscapes (Chen, 2005). This process has benefited from targeted state policies, more 
open borders and improved connectivity of transport networks, especially in China. 
Yunnan province in southwestern China, especially its capital city of Kunming and cities on 
the border with Myanmar and Laos have benefited considerably from the fortune moving their 
way. While Yunnan had important historical trade outposts as a key segment of the Silk Road’s 
southwestern route, the current composition as a province stagnated from the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) through the 1980s and fell much behind the coastal region. The 1990s 
saw a partial return of Yunnan’s border trade. The onset of the 2000s brought about China’s ‘Go 
West’ campaign, which unleashed new opportunities for Yunnan to leverage its favorable border 
location for catch-up development. On 6 May, 2011, the central government issued, ‘Supporting 
the Accelerated Construction of Yunnan as the Important Outpost for the Southwest Region’, 
which tasked the capital city of Kunming to become the international hub and ‘bridgehead’ for 
China’s economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. In May 2012, the Yunnan government 
approved the establishment of six border economic cooperation zones. This provincial initiative 
augmented the central government’s approval of opening border economic cooperation zones in 
the cities of Ruili and Wanding bordering Myanmar. Playing off as the regional base for the 
historical ‘southwest Silk Road’, Yunnan has rebuilt the old connections to Southeast Asia 
through its newly revived border cities. 
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Ruili has been the key city for stimulating lagged economic development within and across 
the border region. Its Jiegao Border Economic Development Zone set up in 1991 promoted 
border trade with the small city of Muse on the Myanmar side. Ruili has really taken off since 
August 2013 when the Master Plan of the Ruili Experimental Zone was approved by the central 
government. It included 238 new projects for boosting Ruili as a gathering place and gateway for 
economic flows with the neighboring Southeast Asian economies. Accelerated development has 
transforming this once sleepy border town with a very small population into a lively city of over 
160000 people today (Chen and Stone, 2017).  
This growth momentum has been met and matched, albeit to a lesser degree, by Muse, which 
created a 150-hectare border trade zone. Since April 2006, Myanmar merchants can freely export 
goods from across the country to Muse and secure export licenses on the spot within one day 
after a formal sales contract is confirmed with Chinese buyers. Furthermore, Myanmar upgraded 
the 460-km-long road that connects the border town to Mandalay, its second largest city in the 
central region. This upgrade not only reduced the travel time from up to a week to 12-16 hours 
but also made the longer journey from Muse to Myanmar’s capital Yangon in the south more 
convenient. Now Myanmar traders operating in the space between Muse and Ruili can board a 
long distance bus to Yangon in 24 hours. Although the road conditions between Muse and 
Mandalay (and Yangon) are not as good as between Ruili and Kunming, the improvement has 
elevated Muse as a major hub for cross-border trade. 
Ruili looms large in Yunnan’s regional role in China’s trade with Myanmar. Over 80% of 
Myanmar’s exports to China and 40% of its imports from China come across Yunnan’s border 
(Singh, 2016). Ruili accounts for the largest share of this trade, while Muse is Myanmar’s busiest 
among its 15 border trading stations facing China, Thailand, Bangladesh and Laos. As of mid-
November 2015, Myanmar’s border trade at Muse rose to $3.36 billion from $2.95 billion in 
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2014.
9
 Border trade between Ruili and Muse is most intensive at the vibrant jade market 
spanning their boundary. This is where Myanmar jade trader Soe Paing sells raw jade. His family 
has been in the jade trade for generations. While examining various pieces of raw jade in his 
shop-office, he said, ‘Chinese people didn't just start to like jade. They have always liked jade 
and used it for thousands of years’ He went on, ‘Our business depends mainly on China though 
since other countries are not as fond of jade as the Chinese’.10 
Beyond the more conventional cross-border trade, the city of Ruili has become the through 
point for a gas and oil pipeline that China has built from the port city of Kyaukphyu on 
Myanmar’s west coast to Kunming (see Figure 3). The gas pipeline became operational in 2013 
and carried 2.86 million tons of gas in 2016, accounting for about 5% of China’s total imports. 
The oil pipeline, which was completed in 2014, opened in 2017 after a long delay and the 
Myanmar government had agreed to lower transit fees. The 771-km pipeline is designed to carry 
22 million tons of crude a year (about 442000 barrels a day) for the Kunming based refinery that 
can process 13 million tons annually.
11
 This new pipeline allows China to move crude oil from 
the Middle East overland and faster instead of through the slower and potentially risky narrow 
Straits of Malacca. More relevant to our framework (Figures 1 and 2), the pipeline provides a 
new and added source and route of energy supply for accelerated urbanization and development 
in southwestern China. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
 
The smaller and less developed cities on the China-Laos border may catch up to Ruili once 
an ambitious cross-border China-Laos Railway is built (Figure 4), preceded and prepared by 
enhanced transport development inside Yunnan. Under an infrastructure plan priced at over $10 
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billion, a rail line from Kunming to the Mohan border crossing is under construction. Moreover,  
Yunnan’s train connections to the border have been strengthened by the new high speed train 
from Shanghai to Kunming. Since becoming operational in December 2016, this line has cut the 
40 hour trip before to less than 10 hours now over 2300 km. It forms a new and vital link from 
zone 1 to zone 2, further integrating the dominant coastal megacity of Shanghai and the rapidly 
growing regional hub of Kunming that has become the ‘bridgehead’ for China’s economic 
engagement with Southeast Asia.    
While the China-Laos Railway was conceived in 2010, the official agreement was not signed 
until November 2015 and ground for construction broken in Vientiane in December 2015. After 
formal construction was delayed without the completion of an environmental impact study, the 
line is now scheduled to be completed by the end of 2021. The line starts in Kunming and travel 
southward to the Chinese border city of Mohan until entering Laos through the city of Boten. It 
then travels past Vang Vieng and Luang Prabang before arriving in Vientiane. The Lao 
government expects roughly four million Lao passengers a year to use the 414-km railway at 
first, 6.1 million passengers in the mid-term and 8.1 million passengers in the long run. 
According to a Lao deputy prime minister, a total of nearly 10 million passengers from China 
and five other ASEAN countries are expected to use the railway annually, rising to 11.9 million 
passengers per year in the mid-term and 16.5 million in the long term.
12
 China envisions this 
railway to extend from Vientiane to the Thai cities of Nong Khai and Bangkok (Figure 4), and 
then all the way to Singapore via Malaysia and feed into the Trans-Asian Railway  linking to 
Europe. 
Given the project cost of $6 billion relative to Laos’ annual GDP of $12 billion, Laos has 
managed to secure a low-interest 20-year loan of $800 million from China’s Export-Import Bank 
and will form a joint venture with China to borrow a lot more to cover the rest of the cost.
13
 An 
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optimistic Lao official believes that Laos will be able to pay the loan back within five years by 
selling to China from the five potash mines yet to be excavated. But given the loan’s size relative 
to Laos’ small GDP, pessimistic government officials worry that the risk of financial crisis and 
high debt will plague Laos after the project is completed.
14
 The International Monetary Fund 
warned in 2017 that Laos’ reserves stood at two months of prospective imports of goods and 
services. It also expressed concerns that public debt could rise to around 70% of the economy.
15
  
It is too early to know if this project will pay off for both sides. For landlocked Laos, the 
railway makes sense for connecting to outside markets, especially if the planned industrial zone 
near Vientiane’s terminal can stimulate manufactured exports and if millions of high spending 
Chinese tourists will cross the border on the train. However, a feasibility study by a Chinese 
company said the railway would lose money for the first 11 years. In the meantime, some Lao 
farmers are denied sufficient government compensation for giving up their land to the railway.   
In contrast, China has brought nearly everything including construction materials and equipment 
to the Laos project.. At the peak of construction, there will be an estimated 100000 Chinese 
workers.
16
 Thus far, China has already benefited from this mega-project by putting its surplus 
construction material and workforce to use. In the long run, China is expected to gain more from 
better overland access to Southeast Asia. This project represents one episode of an unequal 
China-Asia economic partnership (Holslag, 2015). 
 
From the China-Central Asia border region to Europe and back 
China’s ‘Go West’ initiative favoring the vast interior region has produced a second case of 
connected and transferable development creating border intensive change and broader 
international connections and ramifications (the  bolded box in row 1, Figure 2). It requires a 
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tracing analysis of similar energy and infrastructure connections but through more linked places 
over larger territories and longer distances. Of China’s western regions targeted for catch-up 
development, Xinjiang was less favorably positioned than Yunnan. In spite of its vast size, one-
sixth of China’s landmass, Xinjiang has only 23 million people, less than the city of Shanghai. 
While rich in natural resources like oil and agricultural commodities like fruits, Xinjiang lacks 
transport infrastructure and manufacturing capacity. Although Xinjiang’s large population of 
minority groups is similar to Yunnan, its dominant Uyghur group (46% of Xinjiang’s total 
population), with its historical and religious (Islamic) connections abroad, has been seen by the 
Chinese government as a potentially unstable element that should be controlled through 
assimilation and integration. Since the 1950s the central government has relocated large numbers 
of decommissioned military personnel and civilians from other provinces, especially from 
coastal cities to Xinjiang to set up and sustain many quasi-military collective farms in order to 
stabilize its horticultural and livestock economy and border areas, with limited state subsided 
industrialization. This politically motivated policy kept Xinjiang’s development away from more 
efficient pathways and in a relatively slow and stagnated rut through the beginning years of the 
21
st
 century. 
Despite being further west than Yunnan and most west in China, Xinjiang has received a 
larger infusion of the westward shift of investment and development over the last decade, with 
considerable more momentum. So much of this has been riding on BRI, which has provided an 
external boost to the earlier domestically oriented ‘Go West’ initiative. Similar to Ruili, 
Xinjiang’s border region with land ports have benefited the most, grown the fastest, and spilled 
out the most influence over the borderline and farther away. The original border pass-- now the 
city of Horgos--has risen as the ‘Ruili of Xinjiang’ over a few short years, but with a much 
greater ambition and significance.  
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Horgos was the oldest land port on China’s western frontier along the Silk Road and opened 
as a customs checkpoint in 1881. Fast forward to 1983 when Horgos bordering Kazakhstan 
became one of China’s earliest and most open land ports for foreign trade with the good basic 
infrastructure and convenient custom clearance procedure in China’s western regions. However, 
Horgos fell much behind the booming cities on China’s southeast coast in the 1980s and also 
Yunnan’s border cities from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Fortune turned to Horgos in 2006 
when China and Kazakhstan agreed to establish the China-Kazakhstan International Border 
Cooperation Center, as China’s very first border cooperation zone of its kind. Split into 3.43 sq 
kms for China and 1.85 sq kms for Kazakhstan, this enclosed zone straddling the China-
Kazakhstan borderline offers shared infrastructure facilities and linked duty free shopping. In 
2014 Horgos was elevated to the status of a county level city covering a total of 1908 sq kms that 
also includes the large farming areas owned by two quasi-military regiments. While Horgos’ 
bounded territory (around 2000 sq kms) is almost as large as that of the megacity of Shenzhen, it 
has only a permanent population of 86500 and thus a lot of open land for new development. 
Its current small population aside, Horgos has begun to play a disproportionately large role as 
the most important transport hub along China’s western border due to its highly favorable 
location and rapidly developing infrastructure connectivity. Situated toward the central point of 
the Eurasian region and as the central station along the Eurasian Land Bridge, Horgos offers a 
wide access to Central Asia, West Asia and Europe to the west and to China’s huge domestic 
market to the east. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline, which originates from Turkmenistan 
and traverses Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, crosses at Horgos into Xinjiang. It transported 18.4 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas during the first two years of starting to supply gas in 
2009. It connects to China's second west-east gas pipelines from Horgos and stretches 8704 km 
to Hong Kong. In the reverse direction, the train from China’s end of the Eurasian Land Bridge 
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(the coastal city of Lianyungang) through Horgos and Central Asia to Rotterdam ships 22 million 
tons of goods annually. From the Horgos bonded trade zone, trucks from Kazakhstan clear 
customs in a few minutes and deliver Xinjiang’s fresh fruits to Almaty’s street markets and 
dining tables in less than 24 hours, as opposed to the old days when it would take over a week 
beating the purpose of fresh fruit trade.  
Further north from Horgos is another land port (Alataw Pass) and now the city of 
Alashankou. With only a small train station in this remote mountainous corner of China until 
1990 when the China-Soviet cross-border railway was completed, Alanshankou began to grow 
the transit train cargo but remained highly underdeveloped locally and insignificant for China’s 
global economic weight. The place’s fortune turned in 2011 when the first China-Europe freight 
train from Chongqing passed through its border gate and then Central Asia on its way to 
Duisburg, Germany. Like Horgos, Alashankou was upgraded to a county level city in 2012. 
Since the announcement of BRI in 2013, Alanshankou has become another key border hub as the 
transit point for most of the China-Europe cargo trains. This overland train route has different 
comparative advantages over either air or sea shipping. According to an international logistics 
expert,
17
 rail takes between 23 and 25 days (more hours added than shown in Table 1 due to first 
and last mile trucking), ocean 50-55 days and air freight around 10 days.  In terms of price, rail 
service charges $4,000 for a 40-foot container (FEU, each carrying 9600 kg of content), 
compared with $3,000 by sea and $37,000 by air. Rail is much cheaper than air, while ocean is 
cheaper still but it takes too long. For many time sensitive supply chains today like handsets and 
laptops (made by HP in Chongqing for Europe), cutting a few days off shipping reduces stock in 
transit and thus saves much money (Figure 5).
18
    
Table 1 and Figure 5 about here 
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The China-Europe Railway has created a new channel for more Chinese cities to trade with 
Europe. There are now 52 routes established between 32 Chinese cities and 32 cities in 12 
European countries including lines going through northern China, Mongolia and Russia to 
Europe (see Table 1). Alanshankou saw 3800 trains pass through and accounted for 76% of the 
approximately 5000 trains as of September 2017.
19
 Similar to Ruili and Horgos as energy supply 
relay points, Alashankou is where the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline passes through. Costing 
$700 million to lay and running 988 km from Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou, the pipeline 
was completed in 2005 and began operating in May 2006. While its designed capacity was to 
ship one million barrels of crude oil per day or 10 million tons of crude oil per year into western 
China, the line has been carrying up to 20 million tons per year (Fazilov and Chen, 2013).  
As this second case illustrates, the mode and spatial shift of urbanization and development in 
China have produced a longer and more complex chain of energy and infrastructure links from 
zone 1 to zone 4 (Figure 2) and back. Despite the huge distance between China’s coast and 
western land border, the strong state has steered and transferred the early model of Shenzhen 
SEZ all the way to Ruili and Horgos by building them up as newly favored areas for catch-up 
urbanization and development. This transferable development has only been accelerated by 
massive investment in highways and railways to connect coastal, interior and border cities. 
Although these key border cities remain relatively small, certainly by China’s urban scale, they 
have quickly been turned into gateways for extending China’s economic connections and 
influence into Central Asia and further to Europe. In return, they receive and relay new flows of 
energy and traded goods such as  German cars, French wine and Spanish olive oil from zone 4 
via Central Asia (zone 3) for prospering megacities like Chongqing and Chengdu in 
southwestern China (zone 2 in Figure 2). 
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Yet like the China-Southeast Asia case, challenges face China-Central Asia connections. On 
the Chinese side, the infrastructure provision in Horgos or Alashankou has far outpaced the 
shortage of local human capital, forcing Xinjiang government to offer high salaries and housing 
subsidies to lure talents from interior provinces. Externally, the weaker commitment and fewer 
resources in Central Asia for cross-border cooperation has created asymmetrical power relations. 
Given the inability of the Kazakh government to fully build up the commercial and logistic 
facilities in its smaller segment of the border cooperation zone, a Chines company has stepped 
over to build it, thus creating a greater power leverage for China over Kazakhstan.
20
      
 
Conclusion 
In conceptualizing China’s domestic transformation and global rise through a triangular lens 
anchored to urbanization, development and globalization, we begin to see how China has made a 
big difference to the drivers, mechanisms and outcomes of these three ‘master’ processes. The 
Chinese experience presses us to trace the manifestation of its development and globalization 
deeply into how China’s cities have been (re)built. It also clarifies how the undesirable 
consequences of dramatic urbanization, especially economic imbalance and regional inequality 
are being mediated by a strong state’s connected and transferable development policies. 
Motivated by its spatially phased urbanization and development, China has adopted an 
alternative and ambitious approach to globalization through BRI that privileges intra- and inter-
regional infrastructure within and across borders for facilitating peripheral urbanization, catch-up 
development and more inclusive globalization. 
I argue that China’s urbanization is the deepest source and strongest driver of its westward 
development and outward globalization, as well as their mutual reinforcement. As the high speed 
and large scale of urbanization triggered by the SEZs led to the boom of coastal cities and thus 
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regional inequality, the state stepped up its steering role in accelerating and scaling up interior 
urbanization and extending the largely successful model of SEZs to western border cities. This 
policy has led to somewhat lagging but not permanently delayed ‘peripheral urbanization’ by 
upgrading long neglected small border cities. While they are incomparable to coastal cities like 
Shenzhen and Shanghai, their importance can no longer measured only in size and functional 
strength. They have become critical for transmitting China’s domestic development impulses out 
to the underdeveloped border cities and regions of neighboring countries. In other words, the 
latent strength of once vibrant Silk Road cities like Kashgar and Horgos has been activated and 
updated to suit the needs of BRI. The faster growth and larger role of these cities are directing 
our analytical attention from the financial hubs at the top of the global urban hierarchy to the 
understudied small and border cities at its bottom. It also lends some credence to the notion of 
‘planetary urbanization’ reaching remote places and blurring traditional boundaries (Brenner, 
2014). To the extent that this qualifies as China urbanizing from the Global South to influence 
other Global South cities, it can make these ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2006) ‘special’ in their 
new development trajectory. With the potential to spur growth of near-abroad cities like Luang 
Prabang on the China-Laos Railway and of Central Asian cities along the China-Europe 
Railway, China’s border cities such as Ruili and Horgos can play a long-term role in producing 
more connected spatial economies and reducing within and between country inequalities that 
make up the postcolonial geography of a rising Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2011; Raghuram 
et al, 2014). 
From the development vantage point of the triangular framework (Figure 1), the two cases 
renew our understanding of the local, national and global dimensions of development relative to 
urbanization and globalization. We tend to see China as having pursued export oriented 
industrialization led by a stronger version of the East Asian developmental state.. As many 
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Chinese cities, especially those with factory dominant industrial zones on the coast prospered 
from their manufactured exports, their development has been sustained by rich revenues from 
land sales for both industrial use and increasingly real estate construction. Of the total local 
revenues in 2016, land sales and transfers fees accounted for almost 60%. As urbanization fueled 
development has produced serious regional inequality, the state has addressed it aggressively 
through what I call connected and transferable development policies, leveraging the much more 
spacious and cheaper land resources in the west. Building transport infrastructure to connect to 
smaller and the less developed cities in the west has more room and cushion for China to 
rebalance its national economy by reducing the concentration of wealth and production in its 
eastern cities. In addition, small border cities like Ruili and Horgos would not have developed as 
fast without receiving the transfer of the SEZ policy and practice from the coast. Despite this 
policy mobility, over-investment fueled by BRI without regard for different local and regional 
conditions has led to underutilized infrastructure and even entire new ‘ghost cities’ like the New 
City outside Lanzhou (Shepard, 2015), the capital city of Gansu province bordering Xinjiang. 
Globally, China’s rapid urbanization has translated into some kind of development opportunity 
for certain Global South countries through the latter’s large exports of commodities and energy. 
This development benefit however is unstable as China’s slower urbanization and development 
in recent years has already dampened the growth of the Global South’s export of commodities 
and energy. Due to the contraction of its construction market, China, which accounts for half of 
the global production of steel and cement, tries to export its surplus steel and cement as part of 
its push to build more infrastructure in the Global South, and thus may suppress the latter’s 
commodity prices further. In its infrastructure-led globalization under BRI, China also brings 
larger numbers of its own construction workers to overseas mega-projects like the China-Laos 
Railway who interact little with from local communities due to language and cultural barriers. 
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This has contributed to isolated riots in parts of Central Asia where Chinese workers in 
Kyrgyzstan were attacked for having more privileged working conditions over domestic workers. 
If China continues to create little local employment for large overseas infrastructure projects, it 
will fall short of securing the full potential positive local impact of these projects in their hosing 
Global South countries and cities.   
Finally, as China’s urbanization and development have become more externally connected, 
they have reshaped the current phase of globalization through an unconventional combination of 
strategic means and spatial fixes. It reflects the coupling of scale and connectivity of China’s 
global economic power that originates from deep inside its domestic economic restructuring and 
extends far out in an uneven manner. China is pioneering infrastructure-oriented globalization on 
a historically unprecedented scale in the Global South. While China is expected to globalize by 
relocating its labor intensive manufacturing to the cheaper locations in the Global South, it has 
gone further in ‘exporting’ its civil engineering and construction expertise and experience in 
building up roads, bridges and power stations across much of the Global South. China’s crucial 
role in building infrastructure beyond its borders is timely significant in light of the global 
infrastructure gaps. According to McKinsey Global Institute (2016), the world needs to invest 
about 3.8% of GDP or an average of $3.3 trillion to support economic growth, with 60% of this 
need coming from the Global South; yet the world invests only $2.5 trillion a year today, 
creating a huge gap of $0.8 trillion, or $350 billion a year. Having invested 8-9% of its GDP in 
infrastructure at home and abroad, China is capable of meeting a disproportionate part of the 
global infrastructure gap, which renders infrastructure a hallmark of its brand of globalization 
and complicates the more conventional view of China as an export-driven manufacturing power.  
While expecting the more expansive and connected cross-border transport infrastructure to 
stimulate quick manufacturing as at home, China’s launch of many cargo trains to Europe 
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through Central Asia may sustain its declining manufacturing bases in its coastal and central 
regions while generating more domestic consumption by importing more European goods. By 
building and extending infrastructure to and through its far western region, China expects the 
feedback benefits of sustaining its main domestic manufacturing bases and rebalancing the entire 
economy to consumption, especially in the interior. China’s priority for multiplying cross-border 
transport connections to the west has also elicited reciprocal moves from Central Asia as 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to build a new road from Andijan through the 
border city of Irkeshtam to Kashgar in Xinjiang. (Kashgar is the Chinese end of the ambitious 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a critical cog of the BRI wheel.) This will create the 
shortest route for Uzbekistan to export organic vegetables and fruits to the large China market. 
China’s growing cross-border ties with Central Asia, and through the latter, with Europe is re-
centering Eurasia as a geopolitically and now geoeconomically significant region of the world. 
As globalization is heading into perhaps a crisis phase, which is debated in this special issue 
of CJRES, I have presented China as a new power spreading footprints and creating some 
urbanization and development opportunities in the Global South in a way that may refashion the 
course of globalization. China’s strong influence in the Global South has grown from the co-
evolution of its domestic urbanization and development. This inside-out process is capable of 
positioning China as a different kind of globalizer vs. the Global South. By combining an 
analysis of two cases through the framework (Figure 1) and its associated scheme of connected 
domestic and cross-border regional development (Figure 2), I have revealed some hidden and 
missed intersections and interdependencies between China’s domestic economic and spatial 
restructuring and distinctive approach to globalization using infrastructure as the main driver to 
‘Go West’ in order to go further west via BRI. This process has opened a new research vision 
and focus onto small but rapidly growing Chines border cities and similar near-abroad cities that 
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will become more important for understanding the shifting spaces of globalization and thus 
deserve our fresh attention.     
China-led globalization, promising and significant as it may be, suffers from both internal 
and external constraints. Huge investment in building large-scale infrastructure in the Global 
South has contributed to China’s debt rising to 300% of its GDP. From the Global South, for 
example, the inability of the Sri Lankan government to meet the interest payment on an official 
$8 billion loan from China for constructing Hambanbota Port, a key link of BRI, has recently 
allowed the partially state owned China Merchants Ports Holdings to get a controlling stake in 
this port.
21
 While the debt burden may force China to take fewer risks and slow down its 
infrastructure-driven global strategy, the limited financial ability to service debts on projects like 
the China-Laos Railway can translate into a broader concern among the Global South about 
becoming dependent on China. It is up to China to temper its global economic power with a 
more responsible and equitable approach if it can live up to its professed goal and leading role in 
fostering South-South cooperation. 
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Figure 1. China’s triangular influence in the Global South 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Conceived and drawn by author. 
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Figure 2. China’s connected and transferable westward development 
(domestic inter-regional to cross-border regional movement) 
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Source: Conceived and drawn by author.  
 
Notes:  
1. Zones 1 and 2 split China’s long coastal and expansive inland regions, while Zones 3 and 
4 make up vast transborder spaces in geographical scope and distance. 
2. Zone 3 comprises the subregions of Asia that border China’s west and southwest by land. 
It adds up to a massive crescent encompassing a number of China’s western and 
southwestern borderlands off Yunnan and Xinjiang. 
3. Zone 4 forms the western end of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) including the 
terminuses and transit points of a growing number of China-Europe freight trains through 
Central Asia and bound for the latter and its neighbors to the west and south. 
4. The four zones are intended to denote the connected and sequential extension of China’s 
economic and infrastructure connections from its east coast to its vast interior and far 
west under the ‘Go West’ policies since 2000, and then further west into Central Asia, 
onto Europe and back with BRI since 2013.  
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Figure 3. The cross-border China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline: 
from Kyaukpyu to Kunming through Ruili 
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Figure 4. The planned route of the cross-border China-Laos railway 
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Figure 5. The main China-Europe freight train route through Central Asia 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chen and Mardeusz (2015: 6-7).  
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Table 1. Trans-continental rail routes between China and Europe through Central Asia 
 
 
Line Departing 
City 
Destination 
City 
Launch 
Date 
Distance Travel 
Time 
Main Cargo 
1. Chongqing-
Duisburg 
Chongqing, 
China 
Duisburg, 
Germany 
19 March, 
2011 
11000 
kilometers 
15 days IT products 
(i.e. laptops) 
2. Chengdu-
Lodz 
Chengdu, 
China 
Lodz, 
Poland 
26 April,  
2013 
9965 
kilometers 
14 days IT products  
3. Zhengzhou-
Hamburg 
Zhengzhou, 
China 
Hamburg, 
Germany 
18 July, 
2013 
10245 
kilometers 
15 days Consumer 
products (e.g. 
clothing) 
4. Suzhou-
Warsaw 
Suzhou, 
China 
Warsaw, 
Poland 
29 Sept, 
2013 
11200 
kilometers 
15 days IT products 
(from near 
Shanghai) 
5. Wuhan-The 
Czech 
Republic and 
Poland 
Wuhan, 
China 
Czech and 
Polish cities 
24 Oct, 
2012 
10700 
kilometers 
15 days Consumer 
electronics 
(from central 
China) 
6. Changsha-
Duisburg 
Changsha, 
China 
Duisburg, 
Germany 
30 Oct, 
2012 
11808 
kilometers 
18 days -- 
7. Yiwu-
Madrid 
Yiwu, 
China 
Madrid, 
Spain 
18 Nov, 
2014 
13052 
kilometers 
21 days Small 
merchandise 
8. Harbin-
Moscow 
Harbin, 
China 
Moscow, 
Russia 
-- 6578 
kilometers 
-- Products from 
northeastern 
China 
9. Harbin-
Hamburg 
Harbin, 
China 
Hamburg, 
Germany 
-- 9820 
kilometers  
-- Products from 
northeastern 
China 
10. Xining-
Antwerp 
Xining, 
China 
Antwerp, 
Belgium 
-- -- 12 days Local 
products from 
western 
China (Tibet) 
11. 
Guangzhou-
Moscow 
Guangzhou, 
China 
Moscow, 
Russia 
-- 11500 
kilometers 
-- Consumer 
electronics 
(from 
southern 
China) 
 
Source: Tabulated from information compiled by Professor Yina Zhang, Fudan University, 
Shanghai. 
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